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Abstract
Over the past several decades, legislators and regulators have increasingly turned to 
disclosure schemes, rather than substantive regulation, to accomplish regulatory goals.  Most of 
these schemes are either expressly or impliedly based on the disclosure-based regulatory system 
established by the securities acts, which is primarily intended to provide information to traders in 
an established market and thereby to enhance the operation of the market.  A secondary purpose 
of the securities acts is to alter the behavior of firms and individuals through the operation of the 
market.  Other disclosure schemes usually have similar purposes, but they rarely operate in a 
market akin to the financial markets.  As a result, the mechanism by which the disclosure scheme 
is expected to accomplish its purpose is often obscure.  Where there is a specified mechanism for 
the operation of the disclosure system, it often fails to take account of the way individuals and 
firms process and react to information.  This Article examines the purposes and operation of both 
securities disclosure and other disclosure schemes and the limitations on the usefulness of 
disclosure as a regulatory method.  The Article then describes criteria for the use and design of 
disclosure systems as regulatory tools that take into consideration realistic benefits and costs of 
the disclosure regime. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past several decades, legislators and regulators have adopted disclosure schemes 
to accomplish regulatory goals.1 From the Truth in Lending Act2 to the ABA’s Model Court 
Rule on Insurance Coverage3, lawmakers have turned to information as a regulatory tool because 
it is politically acceptable and it interferes less with individual choice and with the operation of 
markets.  Mandatory disclosure has become a sort of “regulation-lite” extolled even by those 
who would ordinarily oppose regulation.4 Even as disclosure requirements have become 
increasingly common and their regulatory goals increasingly ambitious, however, research in 
psychology and economics has cast doubt on the traditional account of how people process 
information.  Current understanding of heuristic biases and bounded rationality suggests that 
information may affect behavior in unexpected ways and may not, in some circumstances, affect 
 
1The earliest instance of which the author is aware of a disclosure-like obligation being 
used as regulation occurred in 1360, when a rule prohibiting the sale of fish in secret replaced a 
rule setting a fixed price.  See GWEN SEABOURNE, ROYAL REGULATION OF LOANS AND SALES IN 
MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 88 (2003).  
2Title I, Pub. L. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.). 
3AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL COURT RULE ON INSURANCE COVERAGE,
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/Model_Rule_InsuranceDisclosure.pdf (2004). 
4See Kimberly A. Strassel, The Weekend Interview with Christopher Cox: Full 
Disclosure, WALL ST. J. May 20-21, 2006, at A8.  Ms. Strassel, a member of the Wall Street 
Journal’s editorial board, expresses great delight at the apparently novel (to her) idea that 
securities markets should be regulated by disclosure. 
3behavior at all.  More troubling, we may not be able to predict how information will affect 
behavior.   Behavioral research also suggests that more information is not necessarily a good 
thing.  Such behavioral research has led to increased calls for changes in the way disclosure-
based regulations are used and have caused some to question the utility of disclosure-based 
regulation at all.5
The model for the use of disclosure as a regulatory device is the system established by the 
securities acts.  That system is not perfect, but to the extent it is successful it is so largely 
because it operates in a rarefied environment: a highly developed, relatively efficient market with 
an enormous support structure of both market and informational intermediaries, in a context in 
which decision-makers often seek professional advice and are surely trying to be as rational as 
possible.  This environment provides a mechanism by which disclosed information can reach its 
audience, affect behavior, and cause a desired result through its operation on a single variable, 
the price of a security.  It is at least doubtful whether disclosure could accomplish similar goals 
in different circumstances, and there is no reason at all to assume that disclosure could 
accomplish different goals in different circumstances. 
 A regulation is supposed to have a goal, and there should be a reason to think that the 
regulation, through the operation of some mechanism, will accomplish the goal.6 Disclosure-
 
5See, e.g., Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: 
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139 (2006). 
6See Administrative Procedures Act §553(c) (requiring that rules include “a concise 
general statement of their basis and purpose”).  In the words of one treatise, “an agency must set 
forth the basis and purpose of the rule in a detailed statement, often several hundred pages long, 
in which the agency refers to the evidentiary basis for all factual predicates, explains its method 
of reasoning from factual predicates to the expected effects of the rule, [and] relates the factual 
predicates and expected effects of the rule to each of the statutory goals or purposes the agency is 
required to further or to consider....”  I RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 
4based schemes tend to be based on statements of purpose such as “improving transparency” or 
“providing information to consumers,” but they often fail to explain why that additional 
information will be of value or why its existence will cause some desired change in behavior.  
The mechanism by which information affects behavior is complex: it must be directed at the 
appropriate decision-maker and the appropriate decision.  The information must be provided in a 
form accessible to and usable by the appropriate decision-maker, and the decision-maker must be 
able respond to the information.  Moreover, disclosure can have significant costs beyond the 
costs of creating and disseminating the information.  
 This article seeks to examine regulatory disclosure systems generally, using the securities 
laws as a paradigm, in an effort to determine when and how disclosure systems work and to 
provide guidelines for the use of disclosure by regulators.  Part II discusses the practical and 
philosophical reasons for the popularity of disclosure-based regulations.  Part III contains a 
discussion of securities disclosure, including its purposes, the mechanism by which it operates, 
and its limitations, and Part IV provides a similar examination of disclosure systems generally, 
using a variety of disclosure schemes as examples.  Part V sets out a number of 
recommendations about prerequisites that regulators must meet before using disclosure systems 
as regulation. 
II.  THE POPULARITY OF DISCLOSURE-BASED REGULATION 
There are dozens, possibly hundreds, of regulatory schemes that use disclosure in whole 
or in part to accomplish their purposes.7 Regulatory disclosure schemes blossomed in the 1980s 
 
§7.4 at 442 (4th ed. 2002). 
7Mary Graham identifies the following examples of disclosure-based regulation: drinking 
water, nutritional content, toxic releases, the presence of lead paint in residential housing, SUV 
5under the Reagan administration as part of a trend to “inform and educate” rather than regulate.8
Disclosure-based regulation had both pragmatic and political justifications.  First, it comported 
with the view that command-and-control regulation does not work.9 Moreover, it is easier to 
require disclosure than to regulate substantively,10 which requires identifying desirable and 
undesirable behaviors, showing them to be beneficial or harmful, showing that the proposed 
regulation will have the desired effect on the behavior, and showing that the costs of compliance 
with the regulation, and the unintended consequences of the regulation, will not outweigh its 
benefits.11 Disclosure can be used to regulate even when we are unsure what to regulate, because 
the decision about behavior is left to a third party, the target of the disclosure.  Also, disclosure 
 
rollover rates, organically grown and genetically modified foods, workplace hazards, sweatshop 
conditions, airline near-misses and mishaps, and lending “red-lining” practices.  MARY GRAHAM,
INFORMATION AS RISK REGULATION: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 7 (Institute for Government 
Innovation, Research Paper 10-01, 2001) available at 
http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/research/papers/m_graham.pdf.  See also William M. Sage, 
Regulating Through Information:  Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1701, 1707-1710 (1999) (describing deluge of disclosure-based regulations in health care). 
8See Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education 
Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation? 1 YALE J. REG. 159, 159-160 (1984).  See 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing:  Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PENN. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999) (noting that regulation by disclosure “has become 
one of the most striking developments in the last generation of American law.”). 
9See Adler & Pittle, supra note X, at 160-161.  See also Sunstein, supra note [Akins], at 
625; GRAHAM, [RISK REGULATION] supra note X ; Sage, supra note X, at 1714. 
10See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 163 (1982); Douglas A Kysar, 
Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer 
Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 526, 527 (2004).  Disclosure schemes can also be used when direct 
regulation is impossible.  For example, the proposed V-chip system combines a rating system 
with parental control technology in a situation where the First Amendment prohibits direct 
regulation.  See Sunstein, supra note [Akins], at 621. 
11See, e.g., PIERCE, supra note X, §7.4 at 413; BREYER, supra note X, at 101-109; 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm? 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 272-276 (2001) (describing the 
difficulties of environmental regulation). 
6moves decision-making away from the government and down to the individual or firm, which 
often permits more efficient decision-making.12 
Second, disclosure schemes comport with the prevailing political philosophy in that 
disclosure preserves individual choice while avoiding direct governmental interference.13 
Disclosure is a “‘soft’ form of intervention” that does not directly mandate change in the 
underlying behavior.14 In other words, it is a form of “civil regulation” – regulation by society, 
not the government.15 Moreover, disclosure-based regulation appeals to those with a pro-market 
political orientation because it addresses market failure without disturbing other beneficial 
features of the market.16 
In addition, disclosure-based regulation may reflect a changing legislative dynamic.17 
The insights of public choice theory apply to statutes requiring disclosure as well as any other 
kind of statute, and it may be that the increase in regulation by disclosure reflects an improved 
ability by regulated groups to use the legislative process to avoid direct regulation.18 Similarly, 
the adoption of less intrusive disclosure schemes by regulators may reflect increased influence 
 
12See Karkkainen, supra note X, at 293. 
13See id.; GRAHAM supra note X (risk reg), at 11; Sage, supra note X, at 1707. 
14John Parkinson, Disclosure and Corporate Social and Environmental Performance:  
Competitiveness and Enterprise in a Broader Social Frame, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 3, 4 (2003). 
15See id. 
16See Sage, supra note X, at 1706-1707, 1796-1797.  See also Sage, supra note X, at 
1797 (relating an anecdote illustrating the importance of couching disclosure as a mechanism for 
supporting a market). 
17See WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KIP VISCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO 
REGULATION 4 (1992); Sage, supra note X, at 1828. 
18See Sunstein, supra note [Akins], at 614 n.7. 
7by regulated parties on agency rule-making.19 
III. DISCLOSURE UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS 
The archetype of the use of disclosure as a regulatory scheme is the system established by 
the securities acts.  The Securities Act of 1933 requires disclosure of a wide range of specified 
information about the issuer of a security before the security can be sold to the public, and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that publicly-traded companies periodically provide 
specified information to shareholders and the marketplace.  Although almost everyone agrees 
that the fundamental philosophy of the securities acts is disclosure,20 the operation of that 
regulatory mechanism, and even its purpose, is less clear.  
A.  Purposes 
1. Reducing Informational Asymmetries 
The purpose of securities disclosure is often stated to be providing more information to 
investors.21 Alternatively, the policy can be described as the “remediation of information 
asymmetries” that existed between investors, on the one hand, and issuers and promoters of 
securities, on the other, before 1933.22 Because information asymmetries cause market 
 
19See GRAHAM, supra note [democracy], at 140.  Cf. Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 571, ___ 
(2005) (making a similar point about the growth in the number of regimes limiting organizational 
criminal liability where the organization has adopted compliance policies). 
20This fact is more newsworthy than one might think.  See Strassel, supra note X. 
21See generally SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A
REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE ’33 AND ’34 ACTS (THE WHEAT 
REPORT) 10, 46, 49 (1969) [hereinafter THE WHEAT REPORT]. 
22See Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street:  A Contextual Approach to the 
Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation,  93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 649-650 (1995).  
Broker-dealer regulation is also directed at informational asymmetries between investors and 
market professionals.  See id. 
8participants to demand compensatory premia, a disclosure policy that reduces those asymmetries 
will improve the price-setting function of the market.23 According to a Congressional report, the 
securities acts are based on the proposition that the independent judgments of buyers and sellers 
in a securities market will best determine accurate prices for securities if those buyers and sellers 
have adequate information.24 Thus, disclosure is essential to the functioning of the capital 
markets because “the most efficient allocation of resources will occur when the information is 
sufficient for the purposes of those making decisions, when it is reliable, and when it is 
disseminated in a timely manner.”25 Pricing risk is one of the essential functions of the securities 
markets, and disclosure of information improves market participants’ ability to assess, and price, 
risk.   
 Also, by making information available to all, rather than allowing it to be distributed 
unevenly to selected market participants in a manner that would be perceived to be “unfair”,26 
disclosure requirements can increase public confidence in the market.  Mandatory disclosure27 
requirements also ensure that disclosed information is standardized and therefore more easily 
comparable.28 Finally, disclosure requirements assure investors that additional information will 
 
23See Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The 
New Evidence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 331, 346-349, 368 (2003).  See generally Robert E. 
Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, 101-140 (2001). 
24ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE, 95TH CONG., REPORT TO THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 563, 574-575 (Comm. Print 95-29, 1977) [hereinafter 
SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
25Id. 
26See id. at 632. 
27There has long been a debate about whether securities disclosure should be mandatory.  
See generally LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 180-187 (3rd ed. 1989). 
28See Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory 
9be available on a regular and timely basis. 
 These goals all involve enhancing the function of the securities markets.  The SEC, 
however, also considers its mission to be the protection of investors.29 Those goals are not the 
same, and may not even be purely complementary.  Market efficiency may be enhanced, for 
example, when investors’ mistakes are punished by losses and investors have the opportunity to 
learn to invest more rationally or to stay out of the market and leave the decision-making to 
experts.30 Modern portfolio theory suggests that any rational investor will hold a well-diversified 
mix of common stocks and other investments.31 Should securities regulations be designed with 
those investors in mind, or should the SEC be concerned with protecting the non-diversified 
investor, who may be at greater risk?32 Also, regulation of different kinds of investments may be 
directed at different kinds of investors:  hedge fund investors, for example, tend to be wealthy 
 
Disclosure? 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 702-704 (2004). 
29According to its website, the mission of the SEC is “to protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation”.  See 
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
30See Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the 
Research Analyst, __ LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. ___, ___ (200_) (forthcoming). 
31See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note X, at 185 n.42. 
32This debate was illustrated by an exchange between participants at the Annual Meeting 
of the Association of American Law Schools Section on Securities Regulation, “Do the Benefits 
of Securities Regulation in the United States Warrant the Costs?, on Jan. 4, 2006 (podcast 
available at http://www.aals.org/am2006/program.html).  Erik Sirri, Director of the SEC’s 
Division of Market Regulation and former SEC Chief Accountant, who was at the time a 
Professor of Finance at Babson College, remarked, “If from a regulatory perspective – for 
disclosure and other things – you were to work from a perspective that investors are diversified I 
think you would have a very different framework for how you approach securities regulation.  A 
lot of things are built around a different assumption.”  Richard Booth, Professor of Law, 
University of Maryland, replied, “And, I would say, incorrectly.”  Professor Sirri responded, 
“‘Investor protection’ isn’t cast as ‘investor protection for diversified investors’.  It’s ‘investor 
protection’.” 
10 
and sophisticated, while mutual fund investors tend to be middle class and unsophisticated.33 
And, as discussed below, the relevant audience for most securities disclosure is not investors at 
all, but informational and market intermediaries.  In sum, the goal of providing information to 
investors is less straightforward than one might think. 
2.  Regulating of Lawful Conduct 
Further complicating the picture of the purpose of securities regulation are those who 
argue that the disclosure requirements of the securities acts are also intended to deter undesirable 
conduct.34 Commentators describing the origins of the disclosure requirements of the securities 
acts usually quote Louis Brandeis’s mot that “Sunlight is the best disinfectant.”35 For example, 
the securities acts sought to address the problem of excessive insider and underwriter 
compensation, including conflict-of-interest transactions, by “emphasiz[ing] publicity of 
insiders’ compensation”.36 According to Brandeis, if brokers’ fees and commissions are 
unreasonable, investors will refuse to invest with them and the brokers will change their 
 
33See Henry T. C. Hu, The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and the 
Public Corporation Model, 60 BUS. LAW. 1303, 1307, 1357-1358 (2005). 
34According to an SEC Report, a “less direct” consideration underlying securities 
disclosure is that “publicity tends to deter questionable practices.”  THE WHEAT REPORT, supra 
note X, at 10.  See also id. at 50-51.  See also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1294-1296 (1999) 
(arguing at length about the legitimacy of requiring corporations to disclose “social” information 
(such as environmental practices), but limiting discussion of the utility of that information to two 
pages, in which she mentions that disclosure will enable shareholders to know what the tradeoffs 
are, will encourage managers to improve because managers “manage what they measure”, and 
will encourage good behavior because people want to look good in the press).   
35LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 89 
(1913) (Melvin I. Urofsky, ed. 1995).  
36See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,
9 J. CORP. L. 1, 45-46 (1985). 
11 
policies.37 
Recent initiatives by the SEC and Congress, while continuing to use disclosure as the 
primary means of regulating financial markets and the participants therein, increasingly appear to 
be intended to affect firms’ behavior.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”),38 which was 
enacted in response to financial scandals at a number of companies in the early 2000s, provides 
an example of this.  SOX requires, among other things, that a publicly traded firm disclose 
whether it has a financial expert on its audit committee and whether it has an ethics code for 
senior executives.39 Neither SOX nor the rules promulgated thereunder require firms to have 
such an expert or an ethics code; however, a firm that does not must disclose why it does not.40 
If the purpose of required disclosure is to provide investors with the information they need to 
make informed investment decisions, this new requirement makes sense only if the presence of 
an audit committee expert or an ethics code is relevant to the investment decision.41 Given the 
 
37See BRANDEIS, supra note X, at 93-94. 
38Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, 116 Stat. 445 (July 30, 2002). 
3915 U.S.C.A. §§ 7264, 7265 (Supp. 2005).  According to the SEC, the purpose of the 
rules was to create “greater transparency,” to “improve the quality of information available to 
investors,” and to “assist the market to properly value securities, which in turn should lead to 
more efficient allocation of capital resources.”  Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406 and 
407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Securities Act Rel. No. 8177, [2002-2003 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,818 at 86,901 (Jan. 24, 2003). 
4015 U.S.C.A. §§ 7264, 7265 (Supp. 2005). 
41Theoretically, a wide variety of non-financial information might affect the riskiness of 
an investment and therefore its price.  Information about corporate governance, executive 
compensation and conflicts of interest might all fall into this category.  However, evidence and 
theory also suggest that decision-makers base their decisions on a limited number of factors, and 
that the quality of decisions declines as information on more factors becomes available.  See 
infra text accompanying notes X.  Furthermore, the link between corporate governance and 
financial performance has not been conclusively established.  See Bernard S. Black et al., Does 
Corporate Governance Predict Firms’ Market Values: Time-Series Evidence from Korea, ___ J. 
12 
amount of information already being disclosed, it is more likely that the unspoken purpose of the 
requirement is to force companies to appoint audit committee experts and adopt ethics codes. 
 Recent efforts to improve disclosure of executive compensation42 are also aimed at 
changing conduct.43 The use of disclosure to rein in executive compensation dates back to the 
original enactment of the securities laws, which envisioned that disclosure of insider 
compensation not only would “alert potential investors that specific firms have relatively high 
levels of direct or indirect executive compensation, but also provide existing investors with 
evidence that could be employed in state unfairness or waste actions.”44 SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox, commenting on the rules proposed in 2006, noted that disclosure of executive 
 
L. ECON. & ORG. ___ (2005), ECGI-Finance Working Paper No. 103/205, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=844744; Phyllis Plitch, S&P Gets Out of Rating Corporate Governance,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2005, at C3.  See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s 
Director Independence Listing Standards, UCLA School of Law Research Papers Series (2002) 
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=317121 (surveying empirical literature regarding 
independent directors and shareholder value) .  
42See generally Proposed Rule: Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure,
Securities Act Rel. No. 8655, [2005-2006 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,517 
(Jan. 27, 2006). 
43The SEC has this to say about the possible effects on executive compensation practices 
of the new disclosure requirements: 
We believe that the extent to which increased transparency and completeness in executive 
and director compensation disclosure would result in broader benefits depends at least in part on 
the extent to which current executive and director compensation practices are aligned with the 
interests of investors as reflected in their investment and voting decisions. Any changes to a 
company that might occur, including changes in corporate governance, changes in control, 
changes in the employment of particular executives or other changes could depend to some 
extent on the degree to which improved transparency in executive and director compensation 
would affect investors’ decision-making with respect to that company. . . .  We emphasize that 
we are not seeking to foster any given directional or other impacts. Our objective is to increase 
transparency to enable decision-makers to make more informed decisions, which could result in 
different policies or practices or increase investor confidence in existing policies or practices. 
See id. at 82,944.   
13 
compensation “is at the heart of [the SEC’s] disclosure mission,”45 that the “market is capable of 
disciplining excessive compensation, provided that the market has adequate information,”46 and 
that it is “important that investors and consumers have all the information they need in order to 
obtain the best possible services from executives and managers at the lowest possible price.”47 
3. Other Purposes 
Whatever else may be debatable about the purpose of securities disclosure, it is quite 
clear that the acts were not intended to regulate securities based on their merits or financial 
soundness.48 The desire to avoid merit regulation arose from a belief that investors, not the 
government, should decide where capital should be invested.49 According to this view, investors 
invest in worthless securities not because they are irrational, but because they lack information or 
are defrauded.50 Once adequate information is available, there will be no need to regulate the 
quality of investments.  
 Commentators also attribute other purposes to the disclosure requirements of the 
 
44See Seligman, supra note [Historical Need], at 51. 
45SEC’s New Leader Shares His Views On Range of Issues, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2005, 
at A13 (published excerpts from interview with Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman). 
46Kara Scannell, SEC to Propose Overhaul of Rules on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
10, 2006, at A1. 
47SEC’s New Leader Shares His Views On Range of Issues, supra note X. 
48See generally JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 50-56, 229-
230, 565-567 (rev. ed. 1995) (describing prevailing disclosure philosophy of Securities laws, as 
opposed to regulation that would have given government the power to prohibit the sale of 
unsound investments). 
49“The purpose of the [Act] is to protect the public with the least possible interference 
with honest business.”  President’s Message, March 29, 1933, S. Rep. No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. 6-7 (1933), quoted in SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note X, at 556-557. 
50See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note X, at 562, 
14 
securities acts, such as preventing fraud and facilitating its detection and prosecution.51 Much of 
the impetus for the passage of the securities acts was the prevalence of misrepresentation in the 
stock market, either by direct falsehood or by omission,52 particularly by investment banks and 
underwriters.53 It is not clear, however, how disclosure requirements serve to prevent fraud.  
Presumably, someone who is willing to commit fraud in a non-disclosure world will be willing to 
create false information once disclosure is required.  However, disclosure requirements can 
increase the effort required to commit fraud.  To satisfy the market where there are extensive 
disclosure requirements, defrauders must construct fundamental aspects of business and present a 
“veneer of plausibility”.54 The disclosure system presumably also provides earlier warning that 
things are going wrong.55 In addition, as the amount of information available in the marketplace 
increases, the likelihood that individual pieces of false information will be able to mislead 
anyone decreases.56 The irregularities at Enron were first uncovered by analysts and journalists 
relying on publicly disclosed information.57 This fact does not, however, go to prove that 
disclosure requirements can prevent fraud. 
 There are other incidental purposes to securities disclosure in addition to preventing 
 
51See generally Seligman, supra note [Historical Need], at 18. 
52See id. at 18-33. 
53See id. at 24. 
54See Larry E. Ribstein, Commentary: Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003). 
55See Seligman, supra note [Historical Need], at 56. 
56See Andy Kessler, Show Me the Books, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2002, at A10. 
57See Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of 
Revenues and Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 97, 105-106 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds. 2004).  See also John R. 
Emshwiller, Opening the Books, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R6. 
15 
fraud.  Disclosure requirements can improve corporate governance.  As one commentator has 
noted, “It provides directors more information by which they can evaluate the strength of the 
company and the performance of the officers; it strengthens the role of auditors in their own 
watchdog role; it enhances the effectiveness of shareholder voting and shareholder litigation as 
constraints on corporate governance; and it permits the governmental oversight agencies to 
perform more effectively.”58 Information can also alleviate agency problems between promoters 
and managers on the one hand and investors on the other.59 
B.  Mechanism of Operation 
Assuming that the goal of securities regulation is to improve the functioning of financial 
markets, and protect investors in the process, the mechanism by which securities disclosure 
accomplishes that goal is relatively clear precisely because the target of the disclosure is 
participants in a well-organized market.  Registration under the 1933 Act makes extensive 
information available to investors prior to their decision to purchase a security being offered to 
the public by the issuer.60 After an issuer files a preliminary registration statement and 
 
58Robert B. Thompson, Commentary: Corporate Governance after Enron, 40 HOUS. L. 
REV. 99, 110-111 (2003).  See also Proposed Rule: Executive Compensation and Related Party 
Disclosure, supra note X, at 82,934 (discussing investors’ need for information in making voting 
decisions).  The 1977 Advisory Committee on disclosure adopted the view (albeit by a narrow 
margin) that the proxy rules should provide information about governance matters, because the 
board is the monitor of management and shareholders must be able to assess the board’s 
performance in order to make voting decisions.  See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note X, at D-22. 
59See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995).  Mahoney argues that disclosure requirements addressed to 
agency problems are much more likely to be effective than general information aimed at investor 
decision-making because the former facilitates bilateral bargaining while the latter must act in a 
complex web of transactions among many parties, a situation in which governmental 
intervention is not generally effective.  See id. at 1089. 
60This process is rather imperfect: the registration statement, which is filed with the SEC, 
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prospectus with the SEC, there is a waiting period during which public communications about 
the offered security are restricted.61 This waiting period prevents issuers and underwriters from 
engaging in aggressive, abbreviated, and misleading selling efforts while the market, or, more 
specifically, analysts and other professionals, digest the information in the preliminary 
prospectus.62 The waiting period also gives individuals time to consider before investing.63 
Disclosure requirements in the secondary market are governed by the 1934 Act.  The 
1934 Act has a different focus because it was thought that the investor in the secondary market 
did not have to be protected from the aggressive sales tactics used by underwriters in the primary 
market.64 As long as the information was available to a sufficient number of market participants 
to set accurate prices, it had accomplished its purpose.65 Thus, full periodic reports, including 
the annual “10-K,” are filed with the SEC.  Only abbreviated material, such as the “glossy” 
 
provides extensive information only to those who seek it out.  The prospectus, which must be 
delivered to a purchaser prior to the sale, contains less extensive information although it is still 
voluminous.  Certain issuers can avoid the burdensome disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act 
through private placements and shelf registrations, which adversely affects the efficacy of the 
disclosure system to some degree.  In addition, the SEC has recently adopted a new regulatory 
system for “well-known seasoned issuers” that is intended to reduce the burdens of registration 
without reducing the information available to the public.  See Securities Offering Reform,
Securities Act Rel. No. 8591, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) [2005-2006 Transfer Binder] ¶87,421, at 
82,373 (2005). 
61The waiting period is twenty days by statute, but that time is subject to extension or 
acceleration.  See Sec. 8, Securities Act of 1933; 15 U.S.C.A. §77h (1997). 
62See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note X, at 568-569, 570. 
63See THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note X, at 106, 129.  Thus, the complexity of the 
investment is supposed to be a factor in considering a request to accelerate the effective time of 
the registration statement.  Id. at 78-79. 
64See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note X, at 575.  See also THE 
WHEAT REPORT, supra note X, at 60-61 (discussing how primary market differs from secondary 
market).   Cf. THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note X, at 50 (discussing the importance of 
information in the secondary markets). 
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annual report, is sent to shareholders.  The periodic reporting system provides a minimum of 
available information and “encourage[s] willingness on the part of issuers to keep the 
marketplace informed.”66 
The content of required securities disclosure is determined by the SEC through the usual 
rule-making process, which includes opportunity for public comment.  The SEC has made efforts 
to streamline disclosure requirements, by, for example, adopting the integrated disclosure system 
for the 1933 and 1934 Acts in 1982,67 and to reduce the burden of disclosure on some issuers.68 
As a general rule, however, the amount of information to be disclosed has increased over the 
years.69 Although fraud liability under the acts is limited to material misrepresentations or 
omissions, there is no requirement that information subject to mandatory disclosure be 
material.70 
How is all this information expected to improve the market and protect investors?  
Ideally, investors would receive it, carefully analyze it, and make investment decisions based on 
their analysis.  Their market activity would then move security prices to more accurate levels.  
 
65See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note X, at 574-575. 
66THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note X, at 332. 
67See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Rel. No. 6383, FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) [Accounting Series Releases Transfer Binder] ¶ 72,328 (1982). 
68See, e.g., Small Business Initiatives, Securities Act Rel. No. 6949, 7 FED SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) ¶72,439 at 62,166-62,167 (1992). 
69The recent overhaul of registration requirements does not reduce the amount of 
information disclosed; rather, it streamlines the process for “well-known seasoned issuers” on 
the assumption that adequate information is already available to the market.  See Securities 
Offering Reform, supra note X, at 82,373. 
70Information is “material” under the securities acts when there is “a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in making a decision. TSC 
Industries Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
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However, few investors have the time or expertise to make appropriate use of the available 
information.  Therefore, an essential part of the mechanism by which securities disclosure 
operates to improve the function of the market and protect investors is the activity of 
intermediaries.  There are two kinds of intermediaries in the securities markets, financial 
intermediaries and informational intermediaries.  Market-makers and other professional investors 
determine the prices at which securities trade, and therefore it is the information available to 
them that determines the accuracy of those prices.71 If those prices are accurate, even investors 
who completely ignore the disclosed information will nevertheless be protected if they trade on 
the basis of price.72 The market itself is therefore a financial intermediary.73 Moreover, mutual 
funds and other managed investments allow unsophisticated investors to channel their 
investment activity through professional financial intermediaries. 
 Like financial intermediaries, informational intermediaries are essential to the functioning 
of the securities disclosure system.  These actors select, analyze and disseminate a more 
manageable version of disclosed information.74 Securities analysts, portfolio managers, the 
financial press and rating agencies (who tend to provide useful selection and formatting 
 
71See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Market Microstructure and Market Efficiency, 4 J. 
CORP. L. 451 (2003) (discussing the complex mechanism occurring within the market by market-
makers and others); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2378 (1998). 
72In the vocabulary of the mechanisms of market efficiency, intermediaries create 
“professionally informed trading” and “derivatively informed trading,” that is, trading by those 
who observe price shifts caused by professionally informed traders.  See Ronald J. Gilson & 
Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later:  The Hindsight 
Bias, 28 J. Corp. L. 715, 721 (2003). 
73See Hu, supra note X, at 1355. 
74See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note X, at xi; Stephen J. Choi, A
Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 45, 
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functions), and “registered representatives” such as brokers and financial advisors all provide 
digested information to the general public or unsophisticated investor.75 In 1973, 46.8% of 
investors reported using stockbrokers for information they used in investment decisions; another 
15.6% used advisory services; and 9.7% got their information from friends and relatives.76 The 
importance of intermediaries has not yet changed.  In 2002, 51% of investors owning individual 
stocks (other than through employer-sponsored retirement plans) said they relied on advice from 
a professional financial advisor when making investment decisions.77 Therefore, the “integrity 
and competence” of the disseminators is essential.78 Not surprisingly, both issuers and the SEC 
consider the needs of analysts and other professionals in designing disclosure requirements and 
 
46-47 (2004). 
75See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note X, at D-9, 312-314, 564 n.11; 
THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note X, at 10, 52-54. 
76See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note X, at 243-244. 
77See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,
EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 77 (2002).  The percentages were higher for investors who 
owned stock through employer-sponsored retirement plans or who owned only mutual funds.  Id. 
at 87, 95. 
78See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets:  A 
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 166-170 (2002) 
(describing analysts’ biases).  See also THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note X, at 319-323 
(discussing obligations of broker-dealers to investigate and consult information before making 
recommendations).  Before the promulgation of Regulation Financial Disclosure (“FD”), which 
requires that any “material nonpublic information” disclosed to securities market professionals or 
securityholders also be disclosed to the public, corporate executives could use information as a 
“commodity” to influence particular analysts or investors.  See Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, Exchange Act Rel. No. 43154, [2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
86,319 at 83,677 (Oct. 23, 2000).   Cf. Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank, `You Don't Like Our 
Stock? You Are Off the List' --- SEC Sets New Front On Conflicts By Taking Aim at Companies 
That Retaliate Against Analysts, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2003, at C1 (describing practice by some 
firms of punishing analysts who make negative reports about their stock).  
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preparing disclosure documents.79 
If the goal of securities disclosure is not to improve market operation and investor 
decision-making, but rather to deter lawful conduct, the mechanism by which disclosure will 
accomplish that goal is somewhat different.  Disclosure still operates by affecting the market, but 
in this case an important additional feature of the market is competition.  For example, investors 
may pay more for shares of companies with audit committee experts, which would encourage all 
companies to appoint such experts.80 Regulation Analyst Certification (“AC”), which requires 
analysts to disclose their compensation and to certify that they actually believe the views they 
express, is intended to improve the quality of analysts’ research by creating competition between 
analysts based on the absence of compensation-related conflicts of interest.81 Similarly, the 
SEC’s proposed rules on enhanced disclosure to investors in mutual funds are intended to 
“promote more informed decision-making by investors”, in light of the perceived lack of 
adequate information available to investors about distribution-related costs and arrangements that 
create conflicts of interest between investors and brokers.82 The availability of such information 
 
79See SEC 1977 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note X, at 5, 11. 
80This seems an implausible scenario.  More likely, the SEC is relying on some 
reputational mechanism for this particular goal.  Cf. Joann S. Lublin & Kara Scannell, They Say 
Jump: SEC Plans Tougher Pay Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at C1 (quoting former SEC 
Chief Accountant Lynn Turner that disclosure of executive compensation will not reduce 
compensation unless shareholders act on the information). 
81See Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Rel. No. 8193, [2002-2003 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,833 at 87,247 (Apr. 14, 2003).  The disclosure is 
also intended to allow investors to better determine the quality of an analyst’s research.  See id. 
See also SELIGMAN, supra note X, at 372 (describing effort in 1960s to use disclosure to improve 
competition in mutual funds). 
82Proposed Rule: Confirmation Requirements and Point of Sale Disclosure Requirements 
for Transactions in Certain Mutual Funds and Other Securities, and Other Confirmation 
Requirement Amendments, and Amendments to the Registration Form for Mutual Funds,
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will presumably allow investors to select funds based on those criteria and thereby pressure 
funds to change their policies.83 
C.  Limitations on Effectiveness 
Despite the fact that securities disclosure is almost universally esteemed as a model for 
regulation by disclosure, there are important limits to its effectiveness.  First, disclosure will only 
be useful if its recipients can process and understand the disclosed information.84 This is a 
particular problem for equity markets, which have extensive participation by ordinary citizens in 
transactions involving increasingly complex financial arrangements.85 The SEC and others 
involved in financial disclosure are therefore seeking to improve the usefulness of disclosure by 
more carefully designing the format of information.86 In 1998, the SEC adopted rules requiring 
disclosure documents to be written in “plain English”.87 The proposed changes to the executive 
compensation disclosure requirements are specifically intended to make the information easily 
 
Securities Act Rel. No. 8358, [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,135 at 
89,008 (Jan. 29, 2004) (hereinafter Proposed Rule: Mutual Fund Disclosure). 
83For a sharp criticism of the SEC’s mutual fund disclosure regime, see Hu, supra note X. 
84See William O. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (N.S.) 521, 523-524 
(1934); THE WHEAT REPORT, supra note X, at 78-80. 
85See Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of 
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 12-19 (arguing that some transactions may be too complex 
for a disclosure system to regulate); Douglas, supra note X, at 527 (noting that equity 
investments are by their nature risky and complicated, and arguing that it will be almost 
impossible to write an understandable prospectus about them).  See also Jesse Eisinger, Ahead of 
the Tape: Misunderstood, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2003, at C1 (noting that “it’s not a coincidence 
that some of the biggest blow-ups, like Enron and Tyco International, have been hard [for 
analysts] to cover”). 
86See Hu, supra note X, at 1345 (describing effort to design useful format for 
information). 
87See generally Plain English Disclosure, Sec. Act Rel. No. 7497, [1998 Transfer 
Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶86,003 (1998). 
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understandable.88 In proposing mutual fund fee and commission disclosure, the SEC specifically 
addressed, and solicited comments on, the format of the information89 and the timing and form of 
the disclosure.  These concerns would be lessened, of course, if disclosure were targeted directly 
to intermediaries.  The SEC’s focus on investor protection, however, requires that investors still 
be considered the audience for disclosed information. 
 The ability of financial intermediaries to serve their role in setting accurate prices 
depends on the market being efficient; that is, on prices reflecting available information.  But the 
market may not be efficient, and there may be limits to the ability of market professionals to 
perform the price-setting role assigned to them.90 In addition, heuristic biases91 can create 
bounded rationality in professionals as well as in ordinary investors.92 Because the number of 
shares of a security outstanding and available to be traded (i.e., the size of the “float”) determines 
the efficiency of the market for that security, prices of small issues will be less accurate even 
with active intermediaries.93 Arbitrage opportunities, which are essential for efficient markets, 
may be limited.94 Moreover, an increasing proportion of investment dollars is being placed in 
portfolios, such as index funds, that are restricted to a specific bundle of stocks for 
diversification purposes; those holders, which may own a very large number of shares, cannot 
 
88See Proposed Rule: Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, supra note 
X, at 82,881-882. 
89See Proposed Rule: Mutual Fund Disclosure, supra note X, at 89,008. 
90See, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra note X, at 723-735. 
91See infra notes X and accompanying text. 
92See Schwarcz, supra note X, at 17-19; SHLEIFER, supra note X, at 12-13.  For an 
exploration of the limits on rational behavior by investors generally, see Prentice, supra note X, 
at 1454-1489.  See also Langevoort, supra note [NW], at 154-155 (providing examples).    
93See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note X, at 735-736. 
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influence the market by their trading behavior.95 
There are also, as we have seen in the past several years, problems with basic 
informational institutions: managers have incentives to distort information; reputational 
intermediaries, such as accountants and lawyers, fail to serve the oversight function expected of 
them; and analysts have conflicts of interest.96 Moreover, securities analysts do not always do 
extensive research and sometimes do not understand the companies they are reviewing.97 
Financial information is increasingly available from a variety of sources of questionable 
reliability at astonishing speed.  Improved access to information, however, may simply give 
people the chance to be foolish faster.98 Also, recent advances in technology may lead investors 
to rely less on professional advice and to rely instead on raw or untested data from the Internet,99 
or to follow investment trends blindly (otherwise known as engaging in “herd behavior”) 
because they are incapable of making reasoned decisions in an increasingly complex 
 
94See id. See also SHLEIFER, supra note X, at 13-16, 51-52, 89-90. 
95See Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered 
Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Rel. No. 8188, [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 86,826 at 87,144-87,145 (2003).  
96See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note X, at 736-737. 
97See Harvey L. Pitt, How to Prevent Future Enrons, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2001, at A18.  
See also Langevoort, supra note [NW], at 149-152 (discussing limits on financial analyst 
performance, including agency costs and heuristic biases such as overconfidence, and 
questioning whether analysts have any effect on the market at all). 
98See Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate 
Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2004); EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL 
TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SPECULATION 237-238 (1999).  Furthermore, 
Regulation FD is specifically intended to bring directly to the public information that was 
previously filtered through intermediaries.  See supra note X. 
99Langevoort, supra note [NW], at 154. 
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environment.100 It is now much easier, and cheaper, for small investors to purchase securities 
without the assistance of a professional.  Publicity about analysts’ conflicts of interest and the 
unreliability of their recommendations may also contribute to a decline in the use of professional 
advice.101 The result of these trends may be, perversely, to decrease the effectiveness of 
securities disclosure by eliminating its primary mechanism, the filtering and processing of 
complex information by sophisticated financial professionals.  In addition, a decline in the use of 
intermediaries by individual investors may also adversely affect the price-setting function of 
market professionals, because it may increase “noise trading” as investors react to information in 
unsophisticated ways.102 
Finally, the availability and comprehensibility of disclosed information is insufficient to 
make information useful if it does not relate to an issue considered salient by its intended 
audience, whether the audience is individual investors or intermediaries.  One commentator has 
suggested that stock option expense was ignored by financial analysts not because the 
information was unavailable or because it was too speculative, but because it was not interesting: 
analysts cared only about earnings.103 It remains to be seen whether increased disclosure about 
corporate governance practices will prove salient to investors and intermediaries.104 Information 
 
100See Schwarcz, supra note X, at 15. 
101However, as of 2002 reliance on professional investment advice had increased from 
levels reported in 1973.  See supra notes X and accompanying text. 
102See Langevoort, supra note [Wm&Mary], at 9; Langevoort, supra note [Nw], at 171-
175. 
103Comments of Susan Lee, Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, Aug. 9, 2002 (CNBC). 
104See Phyllis Plitch, S&P Gets Out of Rating Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
13, 2005, at C3; Ken Brown & Robin Sidel, Scoring Boards on Governance Has Its Risks, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at C1.  See also Bainbridge, supra note [Critique], at ___.   
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that is not salient to analysts and other financial intermediaries will not provide the benefits 
envisioned by the disclosure system, no matter how clearly it is disclosed.  
D.  Substitution for Direct Regulation 
As indicated above, a supplemental purpose of securities regulation is the regulation of 
lawful behavior.  To the extent disclosure is aimed at this purpose, it is attempting to substitute 
for direct regulation.  The SEC’s director-nomination proposals provide a clear example of this 
phenomenon.  In response to a perceived unwillingness by corporations to respond to 
shareholders’ concerns, the SEC proposed to create a new substantive right allowing 
shareholders to nominate directors under certain circumstances.105 The proposal received 
widespread criticism and was shelved.  In its place the SEC adopted a disclosure-based 
regulation, with the stated goal of increasing investor “understanding” of the director nomination 
process, and permitting investors to “evaluate” the nominating committee of the board.  The SEC 
also described a goal of “improv[ing] board accountability, board responsiveness, and corporate 
governance policies,”106 policies that would appear to be outside the usual market-enhancing 
purpose of securities disclosure.  Similarly, the SEC has required that mutual funds disclose their 
proxy voting policies and actual voting practices, purportedly to enhance “transparency” but also 
to encourage mutual funds to exert more pressure on management of the companies whose stock 
they own and thereby to improve corporate governance.107 Most recently, the proposed changes 
 
105Proposed Rule: Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Rel. No. 48626, 
[2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,101 (Oct. 14, 2003). 
106See Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications 
between Security Holders and Boards of Directors, [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. ¶ 87,116 at ___ (Nov. 24, 2004).  The reaction of commenters about whether actual 
improvement was likely to occur was mixed.  See id. 
107The SEC has stated that requiring funds to disclose their proxy voting policies will 
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to disclosure requirements for executive compensation are expressly intended not only to 
increase “transparency” but also to enable the “market” to “discipline” excessive 
compensation.108 In other words, where the SEC does not have the authority, or the political 
will, to regulate directly, it can use a disclosure system to accomplish the underlying regulatory 
goal through the actions of intermediaries and investors in the financial markets.   
 In sum, securities disclosure has three goals: protecting investors by improving their 
decision-making; improving the price-setting function of the market; and, sometimes, altering 
firms’ behavior.  It is able to accomplish at least the first two of those goals because it operates in 
an ideal environment: the capital markets and related financial institutions.  A wide variety of 
intermediaries and a (relatively) efficient market combine to process the disclosed information 
and turn it into a single signal, the price of a security, which can then be used by investors in 
making investment decisions.  The nature of investing is such that investors are likely to be as 
rational as anyone ever is, even if that rationality is significantly imperfect.  In addition, investors 
often seek expert advice.  Thus, the context in which securities disclosure serves as regulation is 
 
“enable fund shareholders to monitor their funds’ involvement in the governance activities of 
portfolio companies, which may have a dramatic impact on shareholder value.”  Disclosure of 
Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment 
Companies, supra note X, at p. 87,144 (2003).  Similarly, the SEC has opined that institutions 
holding shares as fiduciaries would violate their fiduciary duty under the Investment Advisers 
Act by having a policy of always voting with management.  See Proxy Voting by Investment 
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 2106, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) [2003 Transfer 
Binder] ¶86,825 at p. 87,132 (2003)  The SEC has sent a clear message that it wants not simply 
to make shareholder activism possible, but to “encourage funds to become more engaged in 
corporate governance of issuers held in their portfolios, which may benefit all investors and not 
just fund shareholders.”  Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by 
Registered Management Investment Companies, supra note X, at p. 87,146.  See also Ken 
Brown, Heard on the Street: Vanguard Gives Corporate Chiefs a Report Card, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 10, 2003, at C1.   
108See supra note X and accompanying text. [Scannell quoting Cox] 
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quite unusual.  None of these features is available, for example, for a consumer deciding to 
purchase a refrigerator or a salad dressing.109 
IV. DISCLOSURE AS REGULATION 
There are many, extremely varied, examples of uses of disclosure as regulation in 
contexts other than securities law.  Their purposes also vary, although most are intended either to 
reduce information asymmetries in an existing market or to change someone’s behavior.  The 
mechanisms by which they operate or are intended to operate are rarely explicit, and an 
examination of those mechanisms reveals some of the disadvantages and limitations of 
disclosure systems. 
A.  Purposes 
1. Providing Information in an Existing Market 
Many disclosure schemes are intended simply to provide information to decision-makers 
who are presumed to have a pre-existing need for the information, usually because they are about 
to engage in an economic transaction in some market.110 The disclosure system seeks to improve 
the ability of that market to aggregate preferences and efficiently set prices.111 Information 
asymmetries impede market efficiency and result in a great deal of economic activity directed at 
 
109But see Strassel, supra note X (quoting SEC Chair Christopher Cox that his goal for 
the disclosure system is “for consumers to be able to make the same sort of comparison they can 
do when they are buying a car or other products” and marveling at the prospect of “[a]n America 
that isn’t scared to invest, but views a visit to the SEC web site as akin to browsing Consumer 
Reports”). 
110See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics 
(Nobel Lecture), 92 AM. ECON. REV. 460, 478 (2002). 
111The ability of a rational actor to maximize her wealth depends on the actor’s knowing 
the possible outcomes and their probabilities.  See Adler & Pittle, supra note X, at 708; Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, The Domain of Preference, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 717, 717-720 (2003). 
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searching for information.112 Disclosure requirements can improve the efficiency of a market by 
increasing the information available to market participants and reducing search costs.113 
Moreover, disclosure provides market participants with the information they need to make 
rational decisions, as opposed to following the herd.114 In markets with imperfect information, 
market actions themselves convey information.  In an effort to exploit this fact, market 
participants alter their behavior and affect the function of the market.115 Information can reduce 
this effect.  Thus, requiring116 the disclosure of information can reduce search costs in economic 
transactions, improve the efficiency of markets, and provide other social benefits as a 
 
112See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961).  
Institutions and mechanisms can be developed to facilitate search; but ignorance can never be 
completely eliminated.  Id. at 224. Stigler also noted that reputation has value because it 
decreases search costs.  Id. 
113See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note X, at 721; Colin F. Camerer & George 
Loewenstein, Information, Fairness, and Efficiency in Bargaining, in PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE 155, 155 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993).  Lack of 
information may result in market failure to the extent it prevents participants from pricing risk. 
See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note X, at 4.  However, there are limits to the ability of 
information to make markets efficient.  See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note X, at 736-737. 
114See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure:  A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. 
CINN. L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2000). 
115See Stiglitz, supra note X, at 468-439, 473.  See also Camerer & Loewenstein, supra 
note X, at 157-159.  
116Mandatory, rather than voluntary, disclosure is necessary to facilitate market 
transactions because it is difficult for the creator of information to appropriate the benefits of that 
information to herself, and therefore some desirable information either will not be generated or 
will not be disseminated.  See Stiglitz, supra note X, at 463.  Also, just as there are those who 
will want to create and publish information, there are those who will want to prevent creation 
and publication. See id. at 463, 473.  Mandatory disclosure can also help to ensure that 
information is credible and therefore more useful, see Paul Pecorino & Mark Van Boening, An 
Empirical Analysis of Bargaining with Voluntary Transmission of Private Information, 33 J. 
LEGAL STUDS. 131, 153 (2004), and that information that might otherwise be generated on an 
individual basis is standardized and therefore more useful for comparisons.  See Sage, supra note 
X, at 1741-1742. 
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consequence of these economic benefits.117 
Real estate disclosure requirements are an example of market-facilitating disclosure.  
These laws, which require sellers of residential properties to disclose certain information to 
buyers, reduce informational asymmetries between the usually knowledgeable seller and the 
usually uninformed buyer.118 Nutrition labeling is also in part aimed at redressing information 
asymmetries, albeit on a much smaller scale.  Although they do not operate in an economic 
market, campaign finance disclosure laws address informational asymmetries;  they are intended 
to provide information to voters to enable them to make them more “competent” – that is, more 
informed and therefore better able to ensure that their votes match their preferences.119 This use 
of disclosure is not aimed at altering the outcome of decisions, only at improving the decision-
making process, and it can be used in a wide variety of non-market and market contexts, 
including labor markets, capital markets, and product markets. 
2. Regulating Lawful Conduct 
The other common goal of disclosure-based regulation is altering lawful behavior, such 
as the production of pollutants,120 the use of labor practices,121 the use of agricultural 
 
117According to Stiglitz, for example, governmental “right to know” laws have been “an 
important if imperfect check on government abuses.”  See Stiglitz, supra note X, at 488. 
118See Florrie Young Roberts, Disclosure Duties in Real Estate Sales and Attempts to 
Reallocate the Risk, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 1 (2001).  
119See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign 
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 Election L.J. 295, 296 (2005). 
120For example, the Toxic Releases Inventory (TRI), 42 U.S.C. §11023 (1995), requires 
firms to disclose releases of specified toxic substances.  See Karkkainen, supra note X, at 286.  
The information is standardized and publicly available.  See id. The TRI is considered a 
resounding success; toxic releases have fallen nearly in half since creation of the TRI.  See id. at 
287-288. 
121See David J. Doorey, Who Made That?  Influencing Foreign Labor Practices Through 
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techniques,122 the production of household goods and services,123 and even food consumption.124 
A similar goal is to improve the quality or reduce the price of an existing product or service.  
Health care disclosure systems such as hospital “report cards” are intended to improve quality,125 
as are restaurant hygiene disclosure requirements.126 Recent proposals to post the prices charged 
by health-care providers are intended to lower the costs of health care.127 These requirements are 
also aimed at informational asymmetries but with the expectation that remedying those 
asymmetries will result not only in better decision-making but in better decisions and better 
behavior. 
3. Providing Information for Government Operations 
Some disclosure requirements are intended to be used by and improve the operation of 
the government itself.  Regulators need information to design and enforce direct regulation 
 
Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 Osgoode Hall L.J. 353, 355-357 (2005). 
122See Margaret Gilhooley, Reexamining the Labeling for Biotechnology in Foods:  The 
Species Connection, 82 Neb. L. Rev. 1088, 1101-1102 (2004). 
123See Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25249.6 (West 1999) (requiring products to carry labels if they contain substances “known to the 
state of California to cause cancer”). 
124The Nutrition Education and Labeling Act of 1990, 21 U.S.C. §343 (1999), requires 
food processors to label their products with information about specified nutrients.  The format 
for the information is standardized, and the Food and Drug Administration oversees the details of 
nutrition labeling.  See 21 CFR § 101 et seq. (2005). 
125See Sage, supra note X, at 1707-1710, 1715-1720. 
126See Ginger Jin & Philip Leslie, The Effects of Information on Product Quality: 
Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 409 
(2003). 
127See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Insurer Reveals What Doctors Really Charge, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 18, 2005, at D1. 
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systems.128 This information is often not made public,129 although such information is 
increasingly available electronically to anyone who looks for it.130 Disclosure intended to inform 
citizens or consumers about their legal rights131 is also in a sense aimed at improving the function 
of an existing legal regime by reducing information asymmetries between the government and 
the people.   
4. Improving Management or Firm Performance 
Other disclosure regimes are intended to improve the performance of managers, either by 
providing information that can be used to monitor agents,132 by creating information that 
managers would otherwise not have available to them,133 or by forcing firms to confront the facts 
by forcing them to gather data.  Management theory suggests that “managers manage what they 
measure;”134 that is, managers will pay attention to things they are forced to keep track of.135 
128See Karkkainen, supra note X, at 284. 
129An example of this is the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2159 (1994), which 
requires laboratories to file reports only with the government.  See Sunstein, supra note [Akins], 
at 622. 
130See Sage, supra note X, at 1799. 
131See id. at 1765-1766. 
132See Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1955, 1956 (2001). 
133See Karkkainen, supra note X, at 297-300 (describing how information might improve 
management).  See also Charlotte Villiers, Disclosure Obligations in the Company Law:  
Bringing Communication Theory into the Fold, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 181, 182 (2001).  
Theoretically, information that is valuable to management will be produced, since there can be 
no market failure within the firm, but agency problems might result in underproduction of 
internal information.  Moreover, a disclosure requirement that provides information about other 
firms can improve management by providing benchmarks for improvement.  See Karkkainen, 
supra note X, at 261. 
134See Karkkainen, supra note X, at 295, 297-300; Troy Paredes, Blinded by the Light:  
Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation 41 (June 1, 2003) (WASH.
U. ST. LOUIS FACULTY WORKING PAPERS SERIES No. 03-02-02) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=413180; Williams, supra note X, at 1294-1296; Sage, supra note X, at 
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Confidential internal reporting of hospital medical mistakes can provide “a knowledge base for 
hospital managers to use in carrying out safety improvements.”136 Information can also lead to 
improved cooperation between firms.137 The disclosure obligations that accompany the patent 
process fall into this category; they make information publicly available that other parties can use 
to advance their own research and thereby facilitate a kind of involuntary inter-firm 
cooperation.138 A rather weird example of a disclosure obligation intended to improve 
management is the recent change in SEC rules requiring disclosure of correspondence between a 
company and a director who has resigned as the result of a dispute.139 According to then-
Chairman Harvey Pitt, knowing that disclosure would be required will give directors “more 
leverage to raise their issues and concerns, and to be effective in doing so,”140 presumably 
leading to more effective board decision-making. 
5. Increasing Public Awareness 
1778 n.285; Louis Loewenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You 
Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342-1345 (1996).  
135The SEC may have had this phenomenon in mind when it suggested that requiring 
analysts to certify their recommendations will cause them to use more care in making those 
recommendations.  See Regulation Analyst Certification, supra note X, at ___. 
136GRAHAM supra note X (risk reg), at 1. 
137See Sage, supra note X, at 1771-1778. 
138See also Sharon Begley, Science Journal: In Switch, Scientists Share Data to Develop 
Useful Drug Therapies, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2006, at A9 (describing disclosure requirement 
imposed by foundations supporting medical research, which is intended to result in earlier 
cooperation between researchers and clinicians). 
139See Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date,
Securities Act Rel. No. 8400, [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,158 at 
89,508 (Mar. 16, 2004).  
140Phyllis Plitch, New SEC Rules Show Underbelly of Corporations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 
12, 2005, at B4A. 
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 In all these cases, the regulator generally assumes that there is a need for, or at least an 
interest in, the information to be disclosed.  In some cases, however, the disclosure requirement 
may be an attempt to generate interest in the information itself.141 The SEC’s continuing 
attempts to improve the disclosure of executive compensation142 may reflect its hope that 
eventually investors will start paying attention to the matter.  The “Made in the USA” garment 
label and the earlier “ILGWU”143 label probably were intended, at least in part, to raise 
consumers’ awareness of the conditions under which products are produced.  
6. Unidentified Purposes 
A few disclosure schemes, such as drinking water quality reports, are enacted with no 
obvious goal.144 Such schemes are usually said to provide important information, but the utility 
 
141This effect can be unintended.  The disclosure of phenylketonurics (the presence of 
NutraSweet) on food labels has generated both curiosity and concern.  A Google search for 
“phenylketonurics” turned up a number of panicked postings to bulletin boards asking why the 
government would require that it be disclosed if it wasn’t dangerous.  According to one response, 
phenylketonurics disclosure is directed at those with a disorder making consumption of 
phenylalanine dangerous.  See http://www.wwu.edu/chw/ask_the_doc/post/1-1000/0537.html.  
See also Kevin Helliker, To Warn or Not to Warn, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2005, at R7 (describing 
consumers’ reaction to a warning against consumption of fava beans by children, which causes 
illness in rare cases; consumers avoided all beans, including, especially, green beans). 
142See supra notes X and accompanying text. 
143International Ladies’ Garment Workers Union.  Mature readers may remember “look 
for the union label” television advertisements. 
144See, e.g. American Bar Association, Model Court Rule on Insurance Coverage, supra 
note X.  The purpose of the Model Rule, which requires that attorneys disclose their malpractice 
coverage, is “to provide a potential client with access to relevant information related to a 
lawyer’s representation in order to make an informed decision about whether to hire a particular 
lawyer.”  See http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/Model_Rule_InsuranceDisclosure.pdf.  
However, three states have required that attorneys report their coverage to the bar but have not 
made that information available to the public.  See American Bar Association, State 
Implementation of ABA Model Court Rule on Insurance Disclosure, available at  
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/malprac_disc_chart.pdf. 
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of the information may not be clear.  The sex offender registration acts145 are an interesting 
example.  Their stated purpose is to protect the public by informing citizens about the presence 
of sex offenders.146 The citizens are then expected to take whatever precautions they deem 
appropriate, presumably including keeping their children indoors but presumably not including 
killing the sex offender.147 Perhaps the purpose of the laws is actually to cause so much 
harassment that the sex offender leaves town.148 Or registration may result in the offender’s 
choosing to settle in another state after release from prison.149 There is some evidence that this 
was in fact the intended purpose of the statutes, and that they in fact operate as intended to some 
degree.150 
B.  Impediments to Information-Based Regulation 
145Every state currently has some version of a sex offender registration act, which 
generally requires a person convicted of specified sex offenses to register with law enforcement 
officials where the offender lives following release from incarceration.  See Smith v. Doe, 538 
U.S. 84, 90 (2003).  There is also a Federal counterpart, 42 U.S.C. §14071 (1999).  Some of the 
relevant information is made available to the public.  See Smith, 538 U.S. at 91.  
146See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99, 101 (2003). 
147See id. at 105 (noting that sex offender registration web site included warning that 
using the information contained therein to commit a crime against any person was subject to 
criminal prosecution).  See also Knowledge Protects: Online Sex Offender Registries Are Vital,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, April 28, 2006, at 22A (editorial) (noting that it is not clear how the 
registries have protected anyone but arguing that publication of offender information is “vital”). 
148Cf. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100-101 (2003) (describing alleged harassment of 
registered sex offender). 
149This, however, merely transfers the risk to other people, especially if the sex offender, 
having learned her lesson, fails to re-register when she moves.  Cf. Scott v. Shepard, 96 Eng. 
Rep. 525 (1773) (describing the throwing of a “lighted squib” into a marketplace and the 
subsequent passing-on of the squib to avoid injury to self).  Eventually, however, every state will 
have similar registration requirements, and the statutes’ will not longer be able to accomplish this 
goal. 
150See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, 
and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1854-1857 (2005).  If this is true, then 
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 Even where the purposes of a disclosure requirement are relatively clear, however, the 
mechanism by which the disclosure is expected to accomplish its goal is rarely explained. 
Moreover, an examination of the mechanism by which a disclosure scheme operates often 
reveals ambiguities in the purpose of the scheme as well.  However, before we can consider how 
the disclosure of information can accomplish a regulatory goal, it is helpful to understand three 
fundamental limitations on any information-based system.  The first is the ability of individuals 
to process information, the second is the way information affects individuals’ behavior, and the 
third is the way information affects firms’ behavior. 
 In the past few decades, scholars in several disciplines have developed a more nuanced 
understanding of the way individuals react to information.  They have identified a number of 
predictable cognitive biases created by our limited ability to process information.151 While a 
complete discussion of this literature is beyond the scope of this article, some heuristic biases are 
particularly relevant to the operation of disclosure systems.  The availability bias, for example, 
leads people to respond to information based on the “ease with which instances or associations 
could be brought to mind.”152 Thus, people will overestimate the risk of an accident after seeing 
or hearing about such an accident.153 While disclosure requirements can present novel and 
therefore theoretically more “available” information, that information may not in fact be used 
 
the laws may be said to act in a kind of interstate market for desirable residents. 
151See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel 
Kahneman et al., eds. 1982). 
152Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability:  A Heuristic for Judging Frequency 
and Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 164, supra note 
X.  See also Prentice, supra note X, at 1469-70; Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-5 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed. 2000). 
153See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note X, at 178. 
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unless it is also brought to the direct attention of the decision-maker.   
 The “anchoring” bias results in a failure to adjust fully to new information.154 Anchoring 
can be made worse by self-serving biases, which prevent people from accepting or adjusting to 
information that adversely affects their personal interests or contradicts their pre-existing 
beliefs.155 Moreover, people tend to be more easily persuaded by oral communications or 
communications that engage the emotions than by written or abstract information.156 These 
biases are reflected in the fact that people often accept information from unreliable sources,157 
and that anecdotes are often far more influential than statistics in decision-making.158 Finally, 
decision-makers often engage in “herd behavior,” which occurs when they behave in accordance 
with what they perceive to be the behavior of others rather than engaging in independent 
decision-making.159 
Another well-studied limit on the ability of information to affect behavior is the 
 
154See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 supra note X, at 14-18.  
See also Prentice, supra note X, at 1483.  See also Bainbridge, supra note [mandatory 
disclosure], at 1043-1049 (discussing status quo bias and endowment effect). 
155See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 179, supra note X, at 179-182; 
Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note X, at 164-167 (noting the significant role-dependent 
differences in assessment of “fair” settlement of tort case). 
156See Prentice, supra note X, at 1467-1469. 
157See Langevoort, supra note [NW], at 156-163 (discussing trading behavior in response 
to Internet chatter). 
158See Richard E. Nisbett, et al., Popular Induction:  Information is Not Necessarily 
Informative, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 113, 128-131 (John S. Carroll & John W. 
Payne eds., 1976). 
159See Bainbridge, supra note [Mandatory Disclosure], at 1038; Langevoort, supra note 
[NW], at 156-163. 
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“information overload” phenomenon.160 This phenomenon occurs when an excess of 
information causes a decision-maker to reject or ignore useful information and instead make an 
ill-informed decision.  An increase in the usefulness of information leads to better decisions, but 
more information in general leads to higher costs of processing the information by the decision-
maker.  So, increasing the amount of useful information available can actually result in an 
individual’s making worse decisions as the costs of processing new information become too 
great.161 Moreover, as information quality improves, people tend to use more of the information 
available.  Research indicates that as decision-makers increase the amount of information they 
use, their decisions at first improve but then tend to get worse.162 Thus, an increase in the quality 
but not the quantity of information available can also lead to information overload, as decision-
makers are enticed, by its quality, to try to use more of the available information.163 
Studies have also shown that decision-makers who have useless or irrelevant information 
may make worse decisions than those with no information at all,164 and people appear to make 
 
160See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note X, at 90-91; Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, 
Effects of Quality and Quantity of Information on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMER RES.
200, 200-201 (1987) (including a review of the literature). 
161See Keller & Staelin, supra note X, at 202.  See also Camerer & Loewenstein, supra 
note X, at 156 (arguing that people with more information are more concerned with fairness, 
which will impact operation of market).  But see Joann S. Lublin & Kara Scannell, They Say 
Jump: SEC Plans Tougher Pay Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2006, at C1 (quoting SEC Chairman 
Cox: “It’s an odd approach to suggest we’ll make better decisions with poorer information.  I 
know of no market that works that way.”) 
162See Keller & Staelin, supra note X, at 210-211. 
163See id. See also MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note X, at 102-104 (describing study 
showing that increasing less-important information (how to use a product) resulted in 
individuals’ remembering less detail about some things (what precautions to take) and instead 
remembering only more general information (what harm the product can cause)). 
164See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Introduction, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note X, at 5; Colin F. Camerer, et al., The Curse 
38 
better decisions when they use some but not all the available information about the relevant 
attributes of the subject of the decision.165 Because the format of information can cause or 
eliminate information overload,166 it is an important consideration in the design of a disclosure 
system.  The problem of information overload can also be addressed by the operation of 
intermediaries, who are trained to process and sift relevant information, provided that those 
intermediaries do not suffer from their own biases and cognitive limitations.167 Information that 
is not standardized and information that is not designed for easy comparisons will be less useful 
to a decision-maker.168 In addition, the ability to interpret information may depend on the 
sophistication of the decision-maker.169 
Once the targets of a disclosure system have processed the new information, they must 
decide whether and how to change their behavior based on that information.  The amount and 
nature of information that is likely to influence consumer behavior has been the subject of 
 
of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1232 (1989). 
165See Keller & Staelin, supra note X, at 210. 
166See W. KIP VISCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND 
WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMATION 18-26 (1987). 
167See Paredes, supra note X, at 31-36; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Intuitive 
Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES 414, supra note X, at 416; Langevoort, supra note [Nw]X, at 149-152. 
168GRAHAM supra note X (risk reg), at 13-18. 
169 Where verifiable information is known to be available to one party in a transaction but 
not disclosed to the other party, the second party should view that as a signal that the information 
is unfavorable to the first party.  See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information 
of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. OF ECON. 18, 30-31 (1986).  Not all individuals will make this 
inference, however.  In a study of the market for salad dressings prior to required nutrition 
labeling, the market share of the non-disclosing (and presumably higher-fat) brands varied with 
the percentage of college-educated shoppers in the population.  See Alan D. Mathios, The Impact 
of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market,
43 J. L. & ECON. 651, 665 (2000). 
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considerable study.170 For example, researchers have found that the amount of information a 
consumer will seek in purchasing big-ticket durables is significantly influenced by the nature of
the earliest information the consumer receives.171 Consumers who initially used information 
from friends and family or the store where they purchased the product were less likely to seek 
other information than consumers who used books and shopping guides.172 Perhaps surprisingly, 
consumers with advanced degrees sought less information than others,173 and the price of an item 
purchased did not affect the amount of information sought prior to purchase.174 Other studies 
show that consumers respond more readily to a specific warning about a single hazard than to a 
general warning.175 And only new information, not repeated exhortations about old information 
(such as tobacco and seat belts), will affect behavior.176 
170See e.g., ROBERT LEVINE, THE POWER OF PERSUASION (2003). 
171See Richard Staelin & John W. Payne, Studies of the Information Seeking-Behavior of 
Consumers, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 185, 199-200 (John S. Carroll & John W. 
Payne eds., 1976). 
172See Staelin & Payne, supra note X, at 195-196.  See also Ginger Zhe Jin, Consumer 
Information about Health Plan Quality:  Evidence Prior to the National Medicare Education 
Program 13-15 (December 18, 2002) (unpublished manuscript) available at 
http://www.glue.umd.edu/%7Eginger/research/Medicare-Dec02.pdf.   Professor Jin notes that 
although consumers say they want information on health care providers, it is not clear that they 
use it.  Rather, they generally use “self experiences, experience of trusted friends and family 
members, and doctor recommendations” more frequently than formally available information. 
173See Staelin & Payne, supra note X, at 201. 
174See id.
175See W. Kip Viscusi, et al., Informational Regulation of Consumer Health Risks: An 
Empirical Evaluation of Hazard Warnings, 17 RAND J. of Econ. 351, 361-362 (1986). 
176See VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note X, at 6, 31, 61, 123-24.  This may explain the 
phenomenon noted by fitness guru Richard Simmons: “There’ll always be some weird thing 
about eating four grapes before you go to bed, or drinking a special tea, or buying this little bean 
from El Salvador.  If you watch your portions and you have a good attitude and you work out 
every day you’ll live longer, feel better, and look terrific.”  Awaiting the Hot New Diet, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 3, 2005, at D4. 
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 Empirical studies have also found that it is harder to get people to change behavior than it 
is to influence a single decision that they are going to make anyway.177 Similarly, influencing 
consumers to make a one-time change in behavior, such as the purchase of a smoke detector, is 
easier than causing them to change patterns of behavior over time.178 And even if individuals’ 
attitudes change, they may not change their behavior.179 Some studies have concluded that 
information does not change behavior at all, that consumers are not interested in safety 
information, and that providing more information can be counterproductive by leading people to 
become more set in their ways.180 
Another consideration involved in whether someone will change her behavior in response 
to information is whether the information is salient.181 “Concrete, emotionally interesting” 
information is more likely to influence behavior than abstract information because such 
information is more likely to call up “scripts or schemas involving similar information”.182 The 
information that a product “causes cancer” is much more likely to change consumer behavior 
than the fact that it exceeds the Federal recommended daily allowance of fat, although the latter 
probably poses a much larger health risk.183 
177See Adler & Pittle, supra note X, at 163.  
178See id. at 191. 
179See id. at 168-169. 
180See id. at 166-168.  Alternatively, people may over-react.  See MAGAT & VISCUSI,
supra note X, at 163. 
181VISCUSI & MAGAT, supra note X, at 17. 
182Nisbett, et al., supra note X, at 128.  This phenomenon illustrates the operation of the 
availability bias. 
183See generally MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note X, at 174 (discussing inappropriate public 
fears); Kevin Helliker, To Warn or Not to Warn, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2005, at R7.  For 
examples of the public’s inaccurate assessment of risks, see Cass Sunstein, Commentary: Fear 
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 Finally, a disclosure scheme that involves the action of firms, as most do, will depend on 
the complex and poorly understood mechanism by which firms act.184 As economists often note, 
firms are particularly susceptible to agency problems as a result of the differing incentives of  
different actors.185 Various theories attempt to provide an account of the way in which a firm 
will react to external stimuli such as regulation or new information.  The behavior of managers 
will be determined in large part by the structure of the firm,186 which may lead an individual to 
engage in behavior that does not advance the goals of the firm as a whole, but only the goals of 
her unit.187 In addition, information may be lost between levels of the hierarchy.188 Systems 
theory suggests that firms function at an equilibrium which they try to maintain in response to 
external forces.189 According to this theory, a firm will “act” independently of the motivations of 
its employees.190 The view of the firm as a culture posits that each firm has a set of behaviors 
and attitudes that are its own, independent of the individuals in the firm.191 The individuals 
within the firm will behave in accordance with the culture, and their behavior will in turn 
 
Factor: Truth is, Sunbathing is Probably More Dangerous than Terrorism, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2003, part 2 p. 11; MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note X, at 12, 64. 
184See Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences of Regulation, 6
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 347, 348 (2005). 
185See e.g. Rubin, supra note X, at 351; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.
ECON. 305, ____ (1976). 
186See Rubin, supra note X, at 353. 
187See id. at 356. 
188See id. 
189See id. at 358. 
190See id. at 360. 
191See id. at 363. 
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determine the actions taken by the firm.192 
Regulatory mechanisms, including disclosure, must take into account the fact that the 
structure of a firm and the behavior of individuals within a firm ultimately determines the 
behavior of the firm itself.  Individuals in the firm will be subject to all the biases and cognitive 
quirks described above, but the structure of the firm itself influence decision-making.  Senior 
managers may have an incentive to enhance the profitability of the firm193 because they have 
invested considerable personal capital in the firm and because their compensation may be tied to 
the firm’s financial performance.  Theoretically, therefore, they have an incentive to respond to 
economic stimuli such as consumer preferences.  In a large and complex organization, however, 
detailed information about consumer preferences may not be available to senior managers.  
Employees with access to consumer information may not have the same incentives, or 
employment goals, as employees responsible for designing the firm’s products or determining its 
labor or hazardous waste disposal policies.194 Disclosure policies that depend on firms’ 
responses to market activity must consider whether the internal structure of firms makes it likely 
that such responses will occur.  For example, information that affects the capital markets and the 
reputation of the firm may be more likely than information that affects a product market to result 
in changes in firm behavior because those effects are more likely to come to the attention of 
 
192See id. at 364.  See also Krawiec, supra note X, at ___. 
193Alternatively, they may have an incentive only to enhance their own wealth. 
194Cf. Joseph P. White and Stephen Power, VW Chief Confronts Corporate Culture,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2005, at B2 (quoting Volkswagen AG’s chief executive’s complaints that 
managers and engineers paid too much attention to technology and features and not enough to 
customers, and that “managers considered their operations successful because they booked 
profits on sales to other VW business units”). 
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senior management.195 
C.  Mechanisms of Operation 
Given what we know about how people process information and how information can 
affect behavior, how can a disclosure system accomplish a regulatory goal?  Most disclosure 
systems operate through markets, in the broadest sense of the word.196 Providing information to 
decision-makers is expected to cause them to choose the better product.  If enough people make 
that choice, bad products will be forced out of the market altogether or producers will raise the 
quality of their own products.  So, for example, restaurant hygiene improved in Los Angeles 
after enactment of an ordinance that required hygiene scores to be posted,197 and the output of 
toxic waste declined after the institution of the Toxic Release Inventory, which required firms to 
disclose the amount of certain named pollutants they produced.198 There are other mechanisms 
also, however, such as reputational effects and simple persuasion by which disclosure can 
operate.  A disclosure system’s purpose, as well as its context, will determine the mechanisms by 
which it can operate. 
1. The Role of A Market 
195See RONALD J. ALSOP, THE 18 IMMUTABLE LAWS OF CORPORATE REPUTATION:
CREATING, PROTECTING, AND REPAIRING YOUR MOST VALUABLE ASSET 36-51 (2004). 
196See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note [Akins], at 614; Parkinson, supra note X, at 11.  Cf.
Sage, supra note X, at 1781 (citing operation of “competitive forces, grassroots activism, and 
reputational concerns” in disclosure schemes).  A few information schemes, such as the food 
pyramid, tobacco warning labels, and advertising to discourage drunk driving and encourage 
seatbelt use, operate solely by persuasion.  Programs which are intended to persuade people to 
abandon risky behaviors can be distinguished from those, such as nutrition and pesticide labeling 
and warnings about drug side effects, that seek only to inform people of risks and allow them to 
make their own judgments.  See GRAHAM supra note X (risk reg), at 7. 
197See Jin & Leslie, supra note X, at ___. 
198See supra note X. 
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 To the extent that a disclosure system is intended only to enhance an existing market by 
correcting an informational asymmetry, it achieves its purpose if the necessary information 
reaches the appropriate audience in a usable form.  What the buyers do with the information is 
irrelevant.  However, the disclosure will be useless unless the disclosed information is actually 
interesting and useful to the decision-makers in the market.  As noted above, for example, one 
can criticize securities disclosure rules for requiring the disclosure of information that would not 
be material to most investors.  Also, as discussed in Part IV.C.3, below, the information must be 
provided in a format that enables it to be understood by the relevant decision-maker or, 
alternatively, be provided to intermediaries who will digest the information.  Although these are 
not simple requirements, the use of a disclosure requirement to correct an information 
asymmetry in an existing market involves a relatively straightforward mechanism. 
 More commonly, however, regulatory disclosure schemes are intended to produce a 
particular result in a market.199 Food labeling requirements about trans fatty acids presumably 
are intended not merely to inform consumers, but also to encourage them to purchase healthier 
foods.  If those consumers do so, manufacturers will adjust their formulations and produce 
healthier foods, or at least healthier alternatives.  If for some reason consumers used the new 
information to increase their fat intake,200 the system would have improved the function of the 
market but not achieved its public health goal.  If consumers ignore the information completely, 
the system will have achieved nothing.  Thus, the success of the nutrition labeling requirements 
 
199As part of its effort to improve the treatment of animals, the European Union is 
proposing to approve a label on food indicating that it was produced using “humane” methods.  
This will, it is hoped, encourage consumers to purchase such foods.  See Mary Jacoby, EU Arm 
Backs ‘Humane’ Farming Label, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2006, at A19. 
200The temporary popularity of the high-fat Atkins diet makes this hypothetical not as 
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depends upon the way in which the new information affects the market, which in turn depends 
on whether and how the information is used by consumers.  
 This market effect depends upon the existence of a number of conditions.  First, the 
consumers must care about the information enough for it change their decisions.  A consumer’s 
choice of a health care provider, for example, may not be sensitive to price.201 Second, they 
must have a decision to make.  Information cannot alter consumers’ behavior if the purchasing 
decision is out of their hands, as may be the case in the choice of health care plans or 
providers,202 or if there are no sufficiently similar competing products, which may be the case 
with hospitals or airlines.203 Third, the producer must be able to adjust its behavior in response 
to market pressures.204 Existing technology might not make it possible, for example, for a 
manufacturer to avoid using a toxic substance.205 Finally, all the actors in the regulatory drama – 
consumers, producers, and intermediaries – must be acting at least somewhat rationally.   
 Consider OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard,206 which requires chemical 
producers and employers to provide information about the risks of toxic substances to the users 
 
absurd as it may seem. 
201See Sage, supra note X, at 1724-25. 
202See id. at 1720. 
203Cf. June Kronholz, A New Wealth of Details for Comparing Colleges, WALL ST. J., 
June 30, 2004, at D1 (describing Congressional effort to require college and university disclosure 
in order to increase competition and reveal their operations). 
204See Lucian Bebchuk, Beyond Disclosure, FORBES, Jan. 19, 2006, at ___ (arguing that 
executive compensation disclosure will not reduce excessive compensation if the market for 
executives is not functioning). 
205Economists tell us that market pressures will eventually lead to the necessary 
technological developments, but there may be a substantial delay before that can be 
accomplished.   
20629 C.F.R. §1910.1200 (1998). 
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of the chemicals, including to workers who are exposed to the chemicals in downstream 
workplaces.207 The premise of the Standard is that participants in the labor market cannot 
demand the appropriate risk premium for exposure to toxic substances unless they have 
information about toxicity in general and specific workplace exposure.208 Once workers are fully 
informed, wages and benefits will fully address the toxicity risk, manufacturers and employers 
will take “efficient care,” and toxic exposure will be reduced.209 If the labor market is not 
efficient for reasons other than information asymmetries,210 or if other factors besides safety 
dominate decisions by workers, the Hazard Communication Standard cannot achieve its goal of 
improving workplace safety. 
2. Non-Market Mechanisms 
Where the market conditions described above do not exist, there are other mechanisms by 
which information may affect behavior.  The most powerful of these is through its effect on 
reputation.   As one commentator has written, “Had commentator Armstrong Williams been 
forced to disclose that the Education Department was going to pay him $240,000 to promote the 
 
207See Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 105-106 
(1995). 
208Leslie I. Boden & Carol Adaire Jones, Occupational Disease Remedies:  The Asbestos 
Experience, in PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 321, 
325 (Elizabeth E. Bailey ed., 1987).  See also Thomas A. Lambert, Avoiding Regulatory 
Mismatch in the Workplace: An Informational Approach to Workplace Safety Regulation, 82
NEB. L. REV. 1006, 1015-1032 (2004) (identifying the problem of workplace safety as an 
informational asymmetry). 
209See id. at 327; Lambert, supra note X, at 1021 n.69, 1038 n.118.  But see MAGAT &
VISCUSI, supra note X, at 5-8, 168 (discussing inappropriate reactions to information about risk). 
210For a discussion of some of the limitations on bargaining in labor markets, see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 229-231, 240-245 (2001). 
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No Child Left Behind Act, he might not have taken the money.”211 Programs such as “John 
TV,” which post the names and faces of those arrested or convicted of solicitation of prostitution 
on local-access television or the Internet have been remarkably successful.212 It has been 
proposed that colleges be required to disclose racial and economic data for “legacy” and early-
decision admissions, in the hope that schools will voluntarily limit such preferences once their 
effects are known.213 Reputational effects can be especially important to firms, which must rely 
on goodwill among customers, employees,214 the government,215 and juries.216 Using 
information to affect a firm’s reputation can be particularly useful in view of the fact that 
customers, investors, employees, juries, and regulators will often make decisions about firms 
based on prior, background understandings rather than rational analysis.217 In order for 
information to have a reputational effect, however, the target must be concerned about its 
reputation and the public must care about the information disclosed.218 
211David Wessel, Capital: Conflict-of-Interest Disclosures May Not Protect the 
Unsophisticated, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2005, at A2.  See also Sage, supra note X, at 1769-1770 
(arguing that disclosure of unprofessional behavior would discourage that behavior among 
professionals). 
212See Eva-Marie Ayala, Dallas Police Web Site Posts Photos of Arrested Johns, FORT 
WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, June 8, 2004 p. B5.  
213See Daniel Golden, Bill Would Make Colleges Report Legacies, Early Admissions,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2003, at B1.  
214See GRAHAM supra note X (risk reg), at 8. 
215See Parkinson, supra note X, at 14. 
216See Ronald J. Alsop, Word of Mouth is Cheap, But Valuable, Survey Finds, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 6, 2005, at ___; ALSOP, supra note X, at 36-51; Karkkainen, supra note X, at 327, 340-
341. 
217See infra notes X and accompanying text (discussing heuristic biases, etc.). 
218It is interesting to contemplate whether “Sewer Bill Scofflaw TV” would be likely to 
decrease delinquency rates.  See Tattletale Television, KANSAS CITY STAR, July 10, 2005, p. B1 
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 Alternatively, a disclosure scheme can cause the desired result when concerned groups 
use the information in the political sphere.219 Information may be politically exploited in a 
number of ways, including lobbying for direct legislation or regulation and conducting boycotts 
and other collective action.220 An example of this type of disclosure scheme was created by 
NEPA221, which requires governmental agencies to produce an environmental impact study for 
any project having a major effect on the environment.  The goal of the act is simply to compile 
and disclose the data; the agency does not have to consider it or give it weight.222 However, 
members of the public receive the information and can take political action on the matter if they 
care.223 Similarly, proposed disclosure requirements under the securities laws relating to 
corporations’ social activities often have as their goal making information available to political 
activists, rather than investors.224 Community Reinvestment Act disclosure, which was effective 
in causing actual changes in lending practices, was used by the Federal Reserve and the 
Comptroller of the Currency in the merger approval process, by advocacy groups, and by the 
media.225 In order for disclosure to operate through a political mechanism or collective action, of 
 
(describing suggestion that city post on local-access television the names of residents who were 
delinquent on their sewer bills). 
219See Sunstein, supra note [Akins], at 619 (citing “eco-labels” as an example); Sage, 
supra note X, at 1784; Karkkainen, supra note X, at 310, 315. 
220See Karkkainen, supra note X, at 316-320. 
221National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1994). 
222See Sunstein, supra note [Akins], at 621. 
223See id. at 622. 
224See Villiers, supra note X, at 195, 202-203.  See also Donald C. Langevoort, 
Commentary: Stakeholder Values, Disclosure and Materiality, 48 CATH. U.L. REV. 93, 95-96 
(1998). 
225Archon Fung, et al., The Political Economy of Transparency:  What Makes Disclosure 
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course, the disclosed information must be of interest to a sufficiently large and committed group. 
 A number of recent information-based regulations operate by creating a cascade of fears 
resulting from the disclosure of highly salient risk information to consumers.  The interaction of 
consumers’ information-processing mechanisms and the content and design of the disclosed 
information, together with the fact of disclosure itself, may result in the consumers’ over-
reacting to disclosed risks.  This mechanism was used by California’s Proposition 65, which 
requires that relevant products contain a warning stating that the product contains a substance 
“known to the state of California to cause cancer.”226 The alleged purpose of the warning is to 
inform consumers about risks, but the warning provides no information about the actual risk,227 
which may be poorly understood even by experts.228 However, the requirement reportedly 
resulted in manufacturers reformulating their products to avoid the labeling requirement,229 thus, 
perhaps, achieving the regulatory goal.230 
Policies Sustainable 21-22 (Institute for Government Innovation, 2003) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=384922.
226Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25249.6 (West 1999).  See also MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note X, at 165.  Congress is currently 
considering a bill that would pre-empt state food-labeling laws that are inconsistent with FDA 
regulations.  See National Uniformity for Food Act of 2005, H.R. 4167, 109th Cong. (2005). 
227See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note X, at 166.  See also Kevin Helliker, To Warn or Not 
to Warn, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2005, at R7 (noting that some risks are very small and that worry 
itself may be a health hazard). 
228See Peter Waldman, Common Industrial Chemicals in Tiny Doses Raise Health Issue, 
WALL ST. J., July 25, 2005, at A1 (describing new research casting doubt on much that is 
currently believed about chemical toxicity). 
229See Randolph B. Smith, California Spurs Reformulated Products, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 
1990, at B1, cited in Karkkainen, supra note X, at 345 n.364. 
230Banning the products would have required a cost-benefit analysis of a product ban.  
See BREYER, supra note X, at 163, 184-185, 193 (describing issues and analysis surrounding 
proposed ban on saccharin and the disutility of using warnings instead).  The disclosure system 
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 Similarly, the new requirement that food labels disclose the presence of common 
allergens in any amount, including trace amounts caused by cross-contamination, has resulted in 
several manufacturers reformulating their products.231 The FDA has not required, or even issued 
guidance about, disclosing the amount of the allergen present or its likelihood of producing a 
reaction, in part because people react differently to allergens.232 The labeling requirement may 
therefore cause those with mild allergies to avoid foods that are perfectly safe because they do 
not have the information needed to assess their risk.  More likely, manufacturers will reformulate 
their products to remove trace amounts of allergens that would have made the food hazardous to 
a relatively small number of people. 
3. The Usefulness of Information 
Whether the information is directed at a market, at reputations, or at community groups, 
it must be disclosed in a usable way.233 The format of information is extremely important in 
determining its usefulness.234 For comparisons, for example, the information must be in the 
 
accomplished the same result using essentially uninformed decision-making by consumers 
untrained in either toxicology or risk assessment.  Cf. BREYER, supra note X, at 162 (describing 
eight-year process of developing a tire rating system by the National Highway Transportation 
Safety Administration). 
231See Jane Zhang, How Much Soy Lecithin Is in That Cookie?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 
2005, at D1. 
232See id. 
233See BREYER, supra note X, at 163, 164.  Cf. Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: 
Doctor’s Orders are Useless if They’re Befuddling, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2003, at D2 (discussing 
ways to improve patients’ understanding); Schwarcz, supra note X, at 8-9 (discussing SEC 
initiatives to make disclosure more understandable); Note, The Elephant in the Room: Evolution, 
Behavioralism, and Counteradvertising in the Coming War Against Obesity, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1161, 1182 (2003) (discussing FDA’s failed efforts to ensure a useful format for nutrition labels). 
234See MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note X, at 133-156, 159-160; Viscusi, supra note 
[RAND], at 356-361 (discussing results of tests of varying warning labels on bleach and drain 
cleaners). The new FDA drug labeling rules focus solely on format. See Anna Wilde Mathews, 
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same format for both items and placed where the decision-maker will see it at the time of 
decision.235 Information about single facts is more useful than a wide range of information,236 
and in some circumstances rating systems are more useful than raw data.237 Even presentation, 
typeface and design can make a significant difference in the usefulness of information.238 
In addition, intermediaries can serve to increase the usefulness of information in other 
areas as they do in securities markets.  For one thing, if there are a sufficient number of informed 
buyers, the market itself can act as an intermediary for the uninformed and unsophisticated,239 as 
the securities market does.  Alternatively, intermediaries, such as the media and special interest 
groups, can act to interpret disclosed information or digest it into a small number of usable 
signals, in the same way that financial information is theoretically built into the price of a 
security by the action of the market.  Intermediaries, especially the media, can also serve to 
increase the salience of disclosed information.  There is a danger, of course, that the 
interpretation of information by intermediaries may be biased.  Therefore, a disclosure system 
that relies on intermediaries should consider how those intermediaries themselves will operate, 
 
FDA Issues New Rules for Drug Labels, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2006, at D1. 
235For example, comparative information should be placed separately at the point of sale, 
not on the package.  See VISCUSI & MAGAT supra note X, at 18-19, 26, 29, 33-38.  See also 
Lambert, supra note X, at 1042-1044 (arguing that consumers need informational intermediaries 
when data is not presented in a comparative format). 
236See J. Edward Russo et al., Nutrition Information in the Supermarket, 13 J. CONSUMER 
RES. 48, 62, 64-65 (1986).  
237See id. at 59, 67; Jin, supra note [manuscript], at 13, 15. 
238See Viscusi, supra note X [RAND Journal]. 
239See Lambert, supra note X, at 1024 n.77, 1038 n.117, 1061-1062; Michael J. Fishman 
& Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and 
Uninformed Customers, 19 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 50 (2003). 
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and the information disclosed should be designed for use by the intermediaries.240 In some 
contexts, such as the “Energy Star” ratings on home appliances, intermediaries are not necessary.  
On the other hand, disclosure of more complex information into a market where there are no 
intermediaries is unlikely to produce the desired effect.   
 Format, design, and the presence of intermediaries are particularly important 
considerations when the disclosed information is complex or where additional knowledge is 
required to understand the information.  OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard can be 
effective only to the extent workers are capable of understanding the risks of the substances 
described and of pricing those risks.241 The fact that disclosure systems are often used where 
substantive regulation is difficult may increase the likelihood that they will require the disclosure 
of information the relevance of which is poorly understood.242 
4. Examples 
The complicated mechanisms by which disclosure systems operate is illustrated by the 
TRI, which was successful in reducing toxic releases.243 Because the information was so widely 
used by political groups, by the media, and by investors, it is difficult to say what caused firms to 
 
240See, e.g., Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Issues New Rules for Drug Labels, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 19, 2006, at D1 (describing FDA drug-labeling rules aimed at physicians). 
241See supra note X (citing Sunstein, Law of Work).  See also Karkkainen, supra note X, 
at 325 (noting that information disclosed under the Hazard Communication Standard is not 
standardized or presented in useful form). 
242See GRAHAM supra note X (risk reg), at 18-19 (arguing that nutrition and other risk 
information is – and should be – of limited utility because no one really understands the targeted 
risks).  Cf. Karkkainen, supra note X, at 291 (noting, as a benefit of the TRI, that it does not 
require the EPA to determine the risk of a substance). 
243See Karkkainen, supra note X, at 287-288.  For an excellent discussion of the relevant 
mechanisms by which the TRI operated, see id. at 294-331. 
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adjust their behavior.  Among the possibilities are the fear of substantive regulation,244 the desire 
to preserve corporate good will with consumers and workers,245 the desire to preserve the 
personal reputation of managers, the sudden realization by managers that they were polluting,246 
concern for the firm’s stock price in view of investor reaction either to the pollution itself or to 
the potential regulatory response to the fact of pollution,247 or, most likely, a combination of 
these factors.248 
Campaign finance disclosure, which requires reporting of the sources and amounts of 
contributions and expenditures,249 tends to operate through intermediaries such as interest 
groups, political parties, and the media, who have an interest in compiling that information and 
drawing it to the attention of voters.250 Moreover, the information itself operates as a signal 
about additional, undisclosed information.  The identity of a candidate’s or proposition’s 
supporters can help voters decide how to vote, especially if the supporters have well-known 
ideological or political positions.251 Similarly, if the goal of campaign finance disclosure is 
 
244See id. at 311. 
245See id. at 323-328. 
246See id. at 261, 295-300 (arguing that the standardized and easily analyzed TRI data 
enabled managers to address toxic releases and provided benchmarks by which they could 
measure their progress). 
247See Karkkainen, supra note X, at 323-324. 
248See id. at 328-329. 
249See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. II 2002). 
250See Garrett & Smith, supra note X, at 297.  But see Elizabeth Garrett, The William J. 
Brennan Lecture on Constitutional Law: The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the 
Courts & Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 665, 690-691 (noting that intermediaries tend to 
provide incomplete and one-sided information). 
251See Garrett, supra note X, at 678-680. 
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discouraging bribery, rather than or in addition to informing voters,252 then the information is 
likely to be used by opposing parties and the media to draw attention to patterns of donations and 
behavior.  That attention in turn operates through a reputational effect. 
 The disclosure of labor practices can provide ammunition for various groups in the 
political process.  It is also expected to lead to consumers’ and investors’ refusing to deal with 
companies with unacceptable labor practices.  This expectation is based on a number of perhaps 
unfounded assumptions: first, that consumers and investors care enough about labor practices to 
act on that interest when making purchasing decisions;253 second, that consumers and investors 
understand the implications of the information they receive;254 and third, that firms will respond 
to the consumers’ and investors’ behavior by improving labor practices.255 The design of the 
disclosure system can take these variables into consideration once the mechanism of the system’s 
operation is understood.256 
D.  Disadvantages to the Use of Disclosure as Regulation 
Even if a regulator has an identifiable goal that is likely to be met by the disclosure of 
information, there are additional considerations she must take into account.  Disclosure has costs, 
 
252See Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. FEC and Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237, 238-
242 (2004). 
253It is one thing to care about labor practices, and another to refuse to purchase an 
otherwise desirable product because of them.  See Pat Auger & Timothy M. Devinney, Do What 
Consumers Say Matter? The Misalignment of Preferences with Unconstrained Ethical 
Intentions, (April 2006) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=901861 
254See Doorey, supra note X, at 380-384 (noting that wages that seems outrageous to 
American consumers may in fact be quite high and attractive for workers in foreign locations). 
255See id. at 386-388 (describing unintended consequences such as firms’ simply stopping 
production and thereby significantly worsening conditions for local workers). 
256See id. at 395-404 (evaluating several proposed disclosure schemes based on these 
criteria). 
55 
including costs to create, compile, and publish the relevant information,257 and the costs of any 
particular disclosure scheme may outweigh its benefits.258 Disclosure schemes, like all 
regulation, can also have unintended consequences.259 If disclosure of more information is tied 
to the disclosure of some, the scheme may discourage the disclosure of any information at all.260 
The costs of complying with disclosure obligations may result in some actors withdrawing from 
the market.261 In addition, required disclosure can lead disclosers to “game” the statistics.262 
Report cards on bypass surgery reportedly caused some hospitals to reject sicker patients.263 
Law professors may be familiar with the practice of some law schools to alter the statistics used 
in the vilified U.S. News and World Report survey.264 
Intended consequences also have costs.  California may have intended Proposition 65 to 
force producers to reformulate their products to exclude “cancer-causing” substances.  That 
reformulation had costs.  Because the regulation used disclosure, however, the cost-benefit 
 
257See Sage, supra note X, at 1721-1722. 
258See Sunstein, supra note [Akins], at 626. 
259See David Wessel, Capital: Grading Surgeons May Be Healthy Practice, WALL ST. J., 
July 6, 2006, at A2 (noting that poorly rated surgeons may have moved to states that did not have 
report cards); Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process, Univ. 
of S. Cal. Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Jan. 23, 2006 (noting that transparency early in 
the budget process can allow special interest groups to intervene in the legislative process). 
260Sunstein, supra note [Akins], at 628. 
261See Sage, supra note X, at 1783. 
262See Hu, supra note X, at 1317. 
263David Wessel, Capital: Eatery Report Cards: A Model for Schools? WALL ST. J., May 
29, 2003, at A2. 
264See Jeffrey E. Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and 
Resource Allocation: Ways Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229, 232-242 (2006); Alex 
Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, § 4A, at 18. 
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analysis, if any, was unlikely to focus on those costs.  Instead, most regulators consider only the 
direct costs of producing the information.265 In fact, no one considered whether the costs of 
reformulating a product outweighed the risk from the substances involved: the consumer did not 
have the necessary information, and, because consumers generally avoided products bearing the 
warning label, the producers had to weigh the costs of reformulation against the benefit of 
continuing to sell their products at all. 
 In sum, although there are a variety of ways in which disclosure systems can accomplish 
their goals, their effectiveness will be limited by a number of factors that must be taken into 
account in the design of the system.  Moreover, only when one understands the mechanism by 
which the disclosure system will operate can one assess the likelihood that it will in fact achieve 
its goal, and what the true costs of the disclosure requirement are.266 Because disclosure systems 
are politically palatable and relatively cheap, however, they are often adopted without that 
understanding and assessment. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Commentators have suggested a number of factors determining whether a disclosure 
system is likely to succeed.267 For example, a disclosure scheme is more likely to adapt and 
survive over time if disclosers have a stake in its success, if the disclosers receive some benefit 
 
265See Proposed Rule: Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, supra note 
X, at 82,946 (discussing variety of costs of collection, preparation, and publication of 
information but not considering the costs of any consequences). 
266Cf. MAGAT & VISCUSI, supra note X, at 1-2 (noting the need for cost-benefit analysis 
in adopting disclosure systems). 
267See GRAHAM supra note X (risk reg), at 29-30.
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from disclosure and if the disclosure is aimed at organized, committed user groups.268 
Disclosure systems are less likely to work where disclosers are required to report negative 
information about themselves and where the information must be newly created.269 Disclosure 
obligations must also be enforced.270 The enforcement scheme, like the disclosure system itself, 
must be designed in accordance with the goals of the system and its method of operation. 
 A more complete analysis of a variety of disclosure schemes suggests additional criteria 
for success and considerations for adoption.  First, a regulator must identify a specific regulatory 
goal, preferably a non-pretextual one, for the disclosure system.271 Increasing the amount of 
information available to the public is not an acceptable regulatory goal in itself.272 Rather, if the 
goal of a disclosure system is to provide more information to consumers, investors, or the public, 
the regulatory purpose must address why that information will be useful to an underlying 
regulatory goal, and why it is not currently available.  The fact that a disclosure scheme may 
appear less intrusive than traditional regulation should not excuse regulators from stating their 
goal, not least because the goal of a disclosure system will determine the mechanism by which it 
is likely to operate.273 
268See Fung, et al., supra note X, at 38-40. 
269See id. at 34. 
270See, e.g., Sage, supra note X, at 1821-1823. 
271See BREYER, supra note X, at 34-35.  Traditionally, regulation was justified by the 
inability of the market to deal with “structural” problems.  Id. at 15.  The first step of such 
regulation is to identify the problem with the market.  See id. at 15-34 (describing possible 
problems requiring regulatory intervention). 
272One can imagine a Monty-Pythonesque Department of Information, charged by 
Congress with ensuring that all sorts of useful and useless information is disseminated.  At 
present, however, there is no such agency (other than, some might argue, the SEC). 
273Cf. Lambert, supra note X, at 1014 (arguing that the process of adopting workplace 
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 Second, the regulator must identify one or more mechanisms through which the 
disclosure system will operate and should show that the operation of that mechanism is likely to 
result in the regulatory goal.274 If the regulator cannot identify such a mechanism, disclosure is 
not an appropriate method of regulation.275 In addition, the disclosure system must be designed 
with the operative mechanism in mind.  If the system is intended to operate through its effect on 
a decision-maker’s reputation, the information must be designed to reach an audience the 
decision-maker cares about and it must contain information the audience is likely to find 
interesting.  If disclosure is expected to operate through the political process, it must be directed 
at an issue likely to attract the attention of an organized interest group. 
 If the disclosure system is intended to operate through a market of some kind, that market 
must be further examined.  The regulator must show that additional information will be 
sufficiently salient and in sufficiently usable form to reach and have an effect on the behavior of 
market participants, either directly or through the operation of intermediaries.  Whether market 
participants are likely to respond rationally to the proposed information and whether they have 
the power to change others’ behavior by their own market behavior must also be considered.  
The content and format of the disclosed information should be designed to account for the target 
audience’s likely heuristic biases and decision-making processes.  The biases of any 
intermediaries must also be taken into consideration.  The regulator must also conclude that the 
market is sufficiently competitive that decision-makers have meaningful choices and producers 
 
safety regulations should be first, to identify the problem; second, to identify the market failure 
responsible for the problem; and third, to identify the appropriate way to fix that market failure). 
274See BREYER, supra note X, at 193; Lambert supra note X, at 1068-1069. 
275See BREYER, supra note X, at 192. 
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have an incentive to react to changes in demand.  To the extent the behavior of firms is part of 
the picture, the regulator must consider whether firms are likely to respond to the market signal 
as hoped.  
 If the disclosure system is not expected to operate through any of these mechanisms, the 
regulator must identify an alternative.  Perhaps the disclosure requirement is intended to force 
firms to gather information they would otherwise ignore, and thereby improve managers’ 
performance.  Perhaps the disclosure is intended to allow cooperation among firms, by making 
information about innovations available both for further development and for challenge and 
testing.  Such disclosure schemes must be carefully designed to provide information in a form 
useful for those purposes. 
 Once the regulator has identified the mechanism by which a disclosure system is 
expected to operate, she must consider the costs of the scheme.  These will include not only the 
costs of creating, gathering, and disseminating the information, but also the costs resulting from 
disclosers’ or targets’ changing their behavior in response to the scheme.276 The costs of 
unintended consequences, which are likely to be identified during a notice-and-comment 
process, must also be considered.  As with all regulation, all those costs must be weighed against 
the anticipated benefits before the scheme is adopted.  In short, adoption of a disclosure system 
should not be easy. 
 In sum, every disclosure scheme must have an articulated purpose, an identified 
mechanism through which it can accomplish that purpose, a design that takes into account the 
operation of that mechanism, and a careful analysis showing that the benefits of the system 
 
276See Rubin, supra note X, at 390 (noting that firms can usually find a way to avoid 
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outweigh its costs.  Traditionally, securities disclosure met these criteria, although some specific 
disclosure requirements may be of questionable utility.  Moreover, securities disclosure operates 
in a very unusual context.  Securities regulation can serve as a model for other disclosure 
systems only if they are similarly crafted, carefully considered, and designed to operate by 
identifiable and plausible mechanisms. 
 
regulation if they want to badly enough). 
